There have been a variety of methods used to capture transaction data. These include cheques that carry data in MICR – magnetic ink character recognition and turnaround documents with OCR – optical character recognition where the form has already been filled-in automatically for the client to authenticate and return. Other means of data capture are magnetic strips, embossed data codes, bar coding or a device with a location identity such as a phone socket in the home environment. The main applications are in financial transactions from deposits, to loan repayments, salaries, cash withdrawals at automatic teller machines (ATMs), use of credit/debit cards and electronic funds transfer-point of sale (EFTPOS) and others. These seemingly helpful and efficacious systems, however, turn previously unrecorded and/or anonymous activities into recorded-identified transactions. Even more important, the data are being aggregated in a far more intense manner than before and these data have a location tag associated with it in the data trail. There are also real-time location mechanisms built into some of these electronic transaction tools so that passive monitoring and surveillance can now be re-purposed for law enforcement activities.

While locational information and address tags may be readily available when using the PSTN, mobile telephony services including the use of pagers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), analogue/digital and satellite phones make the tracing of persons and locations difficult. With mobile telephony, the tracing of a device and its usage either in real-time or loggedin message banks is more difficult because its location is constantly changing.

By far, the technology of most relevance for present discussion is GPS. This technology depends on a constellation of satellites to give positional information in four dimensions – latitude, longitude, altitude and time. With the Presidential edict of turning off selective availability (SA) – the purposeful degrading of positional information – users of GPS are now able to poll satellites for positional information and be given references to within a meter of their location (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary 2000 ‘Statement by the President regarding the United States’ decision to stop degrading global positioning system accuracy’, 1 May at http://www.ostp.gov/html/0053_2. html). Differential GPS (dGPS) uses the same technology except that locations are determined as a differential to the data received in addition to and relative to a surveyed point on the ground. Hence, the accuracy obtained by dGPS methods can be quite precise. Assisted GPS (AGPS) technology, on the other hand, has been developed in conjunction with information communication technology (ICT) which uses a server at a known geographical location in the network. This information reduces the time, complexity and power required in determining location.

RFID is an abbreviation for radio frequency identification, a technology similar to bar code identification. With RFID, the electromagnetic or electrostatic coupling in the radio frequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum is used to transmit signals. RFID systems can be used just about anywhere, from clothing tags to missiles to pet tags to food – anywhere a unique identification system is needed (See Webopedia definition of RFID at http://www.webopedia.com).

Analyses of geospatial applications with regard to home location, the tracking of individuals over space, tracing financial transactions and communications has identified privacy risks inherent in the use of such technologies. The identified privacy risks may be categorised as invasive, enhancing, or sympathetic as demonstrated in Table 1. The implications for user organisations is that geospatial technology applications is but one of the array of different kinds of surveillance and in particular that of dataveillance. Equally, technology providers should be reminded of these sorts of privacy issues and to genuinely strive for anonymity in the use of personal information when marketing their products.

The implications for policy makers including privacy and data protection commissioners is one where the tensions between economic rationalism and the social good is stretched and seemingly irreconcilable. But this need not be the case if governments are focused on both law and order, as well as striving for stability, consistency, and sensitivity that are supportive of privacy protection.

Geospatial technologies such as LBS may ‘push’ content but at the same time ‘pull’ in locational information. Use of these should not have a chilling effect on personal behaviours or actions. That effect may only be apparent where there is the danger of the acontextual use of personal information and data. Hence, it is imperative that the idea of a ‘zone of privacy’ around one’s personal and private affairs should be fostered and encouraged so that the onus is on those who intrude into the zone to justify their conduct. This zone will then demarcate a boundary to a private and a ‘public’ area with a nebula in between where everyone can interact and relate with each other and for technology to be freely used. Privacy need no longer be “too indefinite a concept to sire a justifiable issue” (Tapper 1989, p. 325).

While technology will continue to be both a problem and a solution, technological advances such as LBS, geoinformatics and GI Science will continue to push the privacy envelope. But technological means alone cannot help manage and enhance privacy protection. Legislation, corporate policy, and social norms may, in the final analysis, eventually dictate the use of location information generated from tracking devices and geospatial technologies.

Fair information practices are the cornerstone of many privacy laws today. However, these practices may be found wanting especially when they have to deal with data manipulation using disparate databases joined together in geospatial technologies such as a GIS. The solutions may lie in a mix of international standards, self-regulation, legislation, and government policy. While the harmonisation of laws and regulations and getting consistency of privacy protection especially across all jurisdictions is very difficult to achieve, yet, international standards must, of necessity, emerge. One way forward would be to keep canvassing for a global convergence of privacy regulation. It is may be counter-productive for each country to impose a separate privacy regime. We are all responsible for keeping an eye on the world in order to prevent abuse of surveillance technologies not by government regulation but by a mutual, shared responsibility for the world in which we live and disdain for those who abuse and misuse the privilege (Waters 2000).